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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code
Ann § 78-2-2(3)(j) and by virtue of 78-2-2(4) pursuant to the
Order of the Utah Supreme Court transferring this case to the
Court of Appeals for disposition dated April 23, 1992.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Stuckers claim that the actions of Summit

County somehow constitute an unlawful amendment of a subdivision
plat, which was not presented at the trial court level and is
raised for the first time on appeal, is untimely and therefore
not properly before this court and should be deemed to have been
waived.
2.

Whether the Stuckers' arguments that their permit was

denied in an arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory fashion and
that Summit County should be estopped from denying them a
building permit were also not properly presented and reserved at
the trial court level and are therefore effectively raised for
the first time on appeal and should be regarded as untimely,
deemed to have been waived and not properly before this Court for
consideration on the merits.
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3.

Whether the trial court correctly determined, based on

the undisputed facts, that the Stuckers do not have a vested
right or entitlement to receive a development permit or building
permit for commercial use of the property in question because
they had not acquired an ownership interest in the property and
had not initiated any actual use, physical construction of a
commercial facility or even submitted an application for
commercial use of the property in question prior to the adoption
of the applicable provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development
Code.
4.

Whether the policy of requiring a compatibility

assessment determination under the Snyderville Basin Development
Code of Summit County is a constitutionally valid exercise of the
police power, both facially and as applied to the Stuckers'
application.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court
views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party and gives no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions, reviewing them for correctness.

However, only those

pleadings and exhibits which were properly filed with the trial
court and before the trial judge at the time the decision was
made should be considered on appeal.

Issues which were not

presented to the trial court and are raised for the first time on
appeal are untimely and should be deemed to have been waived.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
1.

The Snyderville Basin Development Code (R. at 177-184,

which includes relevant excerpts from the Snyderville Basin
Development Code).
2.

Development Code of Summit County (R. at 204-206, which

includes relevant excerpts of the Development Code of Summit
County.
3.

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs/Appellants (hereinafter "the Stuckers") filed a
motion for summary judgment in the trial court based on a claim
of a vested right or entitlement to receive a development permit,
building permit or other form of authorization or approval for
commercial use of Lot 225 in the Highland Estates Subdivision in
Summit County, State of Utah.

The Stuckers further challenged

the legislative discretion of the Board of Summit County
Commissioners in the adoption of certain provisions of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code, which require a compatibility
assessment of proposed uses as an absolute policy that must be
complied with prior to receiving approval for a development
permit.
Defendant/Appellee Summit County (hereinafter "Summit
County") filed a cross-motion for summary judgment contending
that plaintiffs had not acquired an ownership interest in the
property and had not initiated any actual use, started
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construction or even made application for commercial use of the
property in question until some five (5) years after the adoption
of a new zoning ordinance for that geographic area of Summit
County, and therefore had not created any vested right or
entitlement to receive a development permit or building permit
for any such commercial use.

Summit County further argued that

the Snyderville Basin Development Code is a constitutionally
valid exercise of the police power, both facially and as applied
to these facts and circumstances, and provides adequate
boundaries on the exercise of discretion by the Summit County
Planning Commission in its implementation.
Following the submission of the cross-motions for summary
judgment by the parties and supporting memoranda and exhibits
with respect to these motions, the district court heard oral
argument on the motions on October 15, 1991. Thereafter the
District Court issued a minute entry dated October 30, 1991,
denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granting
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The Summary Judg-

ment And Order Of Dismissal was signed and entered by the trial
court on December 16, 1991.

The Highland Estates Homeowners

Association, Kathy Mears, Dave Rich, Elwayne Daly and Sue Smith
were named as additional defendants at the trial court level but
were dismissed by stipulation pursuant to an Order Of Dismissal
dated March 24, 1992. The Stuckers are only appealing the entry
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of summary judgment dismissing their complaint against
defendant/appellee Summit County.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Response to the Stuckers' "Factual Background."

Summit County disagrees with certain statements set forth in
the Stuckers' "Factual Background" set forth at pages 4 - 8 of
Appellant's Brief.

First and foremost, the entire

characterization of this as simply an application for a building
permit is erroneous and misleading.

The compatibility

assessment process set forth in Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville
Basin Development Code is the land use and zoning component of
the development approval process (see Statement of Fact No. 4 at
p. 7, infra).

Only after the proposed use of the property has

been found to be reasonably compatible and sensitive to the
immediate environment and neighboring uses is such an application
reviewed to determine its compliance with other technical
requirements, such as the Uniform Building Code.
Paragraph 1 also mischaracterizes the prior recording of the
Highland Estates Subdivision plat as constituting a "zone
change."

The undisputed facts reveal that no zoning ordinance

was adopted in Summit County until 1977 (f 1 at p. 7, infra).
Paragraph 4 of the Stuckers' factual background confuses the
subdivision approval process as applied to minimum lot sizes with
specific allowable use determinations for individual lots.
Paragraph 6 sets forth information not supported in the record
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and which is otherwise irrelevant.

Specifically, there is no

information in the record to support the conclusion that the lot
in question is located within the commercial "node" known as
Silver Creek Junction as that term is used in Chapter 5.7.3 of
the Snyderville Basin Development Code.

Beyond that, the

language in question simply encourages the clustering of
commercial uses in such areas but does not assure or guarantee
any such entitlement.

Furthermore, a letter from a prior

planning director to a previous owner stating a personal opinion
with respect to the preferred use of the property in question is
completely irrelevant to Summit County's response to a specific
development application made over a year later.
B.

Summit County's Statement of Undisputed Facts.

The following facts are specifically supported by references
to the record as reflected in Summit County's initial memorandum
in support of its motion for summary judgment in the District
Court and were not controverted or disputed by plaintiffs in
their memoranda filed at the District Court level.
1.

(R. at 207).

The first zoning ordinance ever adopted by Summit

County was the Development Code of Summit County, which became
effective August 1, 1977 (R. at 157, 173).
2.

On March 13, 1975, the Summit County Commission adopted

the provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development Code which
became effective on April 15, 1985, and applied to all uses
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within the Snyderville Basin.

The property in question is

located within the Snyderville Basin.
3.

(R. at 157, 177).

Prior to the adoption of the Snyderville Basin

Development Code in 1985, the parcel in question was zoned for
commercial use.
4.

(R. at 157).

The Snyderville Basin Development Code established the

Snyderville Basin Zoning District and replaced traditional "hard"
zoning designations of property with a permit system, sometimes
referred to as "performance zoning," which requires that all
proposed developments within the district satisfy certain
"absolute

policies" prior to receiving a development permit, to

include a compatibility assessment.

Under the provisions of

Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, that
compatibility assessment process occurs prior to the formal
filing of an actual application for a development permit and
includes a neighborhood meeting.

In those circumstances in which

a developer and affected property owners have not been able to
reach a consensus of opinion regarding compatibility of the
proposed use of the site, a public hearing is held before the
Planning Commission prior to a decision being made by the
Planning Commission as to whether the proposed project is
compatible with surrounding development and should be allowed to
proceed.

(R. at 157-158, 177-184, which includes relevant

excerpts from the Snyderville Basin Development Code).
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5.

The Stuckers obtained an ownership interest in Lot 225

of the Highland Estates Subdivision on or about March 6, 1990,
and the lot is held in a joint tenancy including Steve Stucker,
Harold Stucker and Lucy Stucker.
6.

(R. at 158, 186-189).

On or about May 31, 1990, the Stuckers submitted an

application proposing to develop the site in question as "a
limited production, high quality auto body and detail shop."
(R. at 158, 191).
7.

Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 4.1(a) of the

Snyderville Basin Development Code, the County Commission
delegated to the Planning Director and staff the authority to
issue what ctre referred to as Class I Development Permits, unless
the director determines it would be "in the best interests of the
public" that the application be handled as a Class II permit with
direct revi€>w by the Planning Commission.

Consistent with his

prior habit, practice, custom and routine, Planning Director Jim
Peterson determined that there was a considerable amount of
interest in the proposed development and therefore referred it to
the Plannincf Commission as a Class II permit.

(R. at 158-159,

174-175).
8.

In conformance with the provisions of the Snyderville

Basin Development Code, a neighborhood compatibility assessment
meeting was held on or about August 2, 1990 to review the
proposed use of the property.

A consensus of opinion regarding

the proposed development was not reached, and therefore, a public
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hearing was held before the Summit County Planning Commission on
or about August 28, 1990, to facilitate a full discussion of the
issues relative to the compatibility assessment determination.
On the basis of the issues raised at the neighborhood
compatibility meeting and the public hearing before the Planning
Commission, including but not limited to, concern regarding
whether increased traffic, curves and blind spots on the road
providing access to the property would represent safety hazards,
incompatibility of this commercial use with surrounding
residential uses and the country atmosphere in the vicinity,
possible lowering of property values, conflicts over increased
traffic and school bus routing and other related issues, the
Planning Commission denied the project because of compatibility
issues.
9.

(R. at 159-160, 193-197).
On or about October 3, 1990, the Summit County

Commission denied plaintiffs' appeal from the decision of the
Planning Commission on the absolute policy of the compatibility
with neighboring uses.
10.

(R. at 160, 199-202).

Under the Development Code of Summit County, which was

adopted in 1977 and would have been applicable to the property in
question prior to the adoption of the Snyderville Basin
Development Code in 1985, an owner or developer of a long-term
multi-phased project could request a change in zoning for the
entire project and have a project master plan approved by the
Planning Commission and Board of County Commissioners and enter
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into an agreement to change the zoning for the entire project,
with such zoning to become effective at such time as each phase
of the project has been approved for final platting.

Other

"developments" defined in the Code as any "man made change to
improved or unimproved real estate. . .," could also petition for
amendments to the master plan or zone amendments.

(R. at 160,

204-206).
11.

At the time of the adoption of the Snyderville Basin

Development Code in 1985, any property where "specific development" as thcit term is defined in the code, had actually been
initiated through master plan or zone change approval prior to
the effective date of the Snyderville Basin Development Code
would be regarded as having been "grandfathered" and have the
option to either continue such development under the provisions
of the old Development Code or submit an application for a
development permit under the provisions of the Snyderville Basin
Development Code.
12.

(R. at 160-161, 177-184).

The Highland Estates Subdivision Plat had previously

been recordcid, but no "development" as that term is defined in
the applicable ordinances had occurred or been initiated on
Lot 225 of the Highland Estates Subdivision prior to the adoption
of the Snyderville Basin Development Code.
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(R. at 161).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Stuckers have raised for the first time on appeal a

number of new arguments not properly presented or reserved at the
trial court level. Those include the contention that the actions
of Summit County regarding their application somehow constitute
an improper amendment of a previously recorded subdivision plat,
the claim that their permit was denied in an arbitrary,
capricious and discriminatory fashion and that Summit County
should be estopped from denying them a building permit for
commercial use of the property.

None of these arguments were

properly framed, presented or reserved at the trial court level
and are therefore untimely, should be deemed waived and should
not be considered on the merits by this court.
2.

The Stuckers do not have a vested right or entitlement

for commercial use of the property in question because they had
not acquired an ownership interest, had not initiated any actual
use and had not begun construction or had even made application
for commercial use of the property in question until five full
years after the adoption of the applicable provisions of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code, including the compatibility
assessment policy challenged here.

The trial court correctly

determined that Summit County was entitled to prevail on that
issue as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts. The
Stuckers have further alleged that Summit County should be
estopped from denying their building permit, but the doctrine of
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equitable estoppel is only available as a defense which may be
asserted against enforcement by a governmental agency under
exceptional circumstances and does not apply to the issues
presented in this appeal.
3.

The compatibility assessment policy set forth in

Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code of Summit
County is a constitutionally valid exercise of the police power,
both facially and as applied to the facts and circumstances of
this case.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ACTIONS OF SUMMIT COUNTY REGARDING THE STUCKERS' APPLICATION
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A VACATION, ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF
A PREVIOUSLY RECORDED SUBDIVISION PLAT AND
SUCH A CLAIM WAS NOT PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL
AND IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND THEREFORE
IS UNTIMELY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT
It is axiomatic that a party may not present an issue for
the first time on appeal.

The Stuckers belatedly add an entirely

new and unrelated claim that the actions of Summit County in
processing their application for a development permit somehow
amount to a vacation, alteration or amendment of a previouslyrecorded subdivision plat in violation of state statutory
provisions dictating the proper procedure and grounds for such
amendments or changes.

No where in the Stuckers7 pleadings at

the trial court level or even their docketing statement filed in
this appeal is there so much as a passing mention of any such
issue.

As this court has repeatedly stated, it "will not address
- 12 -

an issue for the first time on appeal.11

Wurst v Department of

Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah App. 1991).
(Citations omitted).

Any such claim is therefore untimely, not

properly before the Court and should be deemed to have been
waived, therefore precluding this court from considering the
merits of the argument on appeal.
Even if this Court to address the subdivision plat amendment
issue on its merits, even a cursory review reveals a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of subdivision plat approval and
recordation which fails as a matter of law.

The argument

confuses land use planning and zoning activity which control the
uses of land with subdivision regulations and control that
facilitate the orderly development and sale of property and
assure that such developments are designed to accommodate the
needs of future occupants of the subdivision, particularly with
respect to the identification and dedication of public streets,
alleys and other public places.

Subdivision plats do not

generally mention, identify, create or otherwise purport to
control the uses of land that may be made within the platted
parcels.

The only direct mention of zoning in conjunction with

subdivision layout is to assure that each lot in a subdivision
meets the frontage width and area requirements of the applicable
zone.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-5-3.

It defies common sense to

suggest that Summit County's approval or denial of an application
for a specific use of a lot within a platted subdivision somehow
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constitutes a vacation, alteration or amendment of a previously
recorded plat.
II.
THE STUCKERS' ARGUMENTS SET FORTH IN THEIR BRIEF CONTENDING
THAT THEIR PERMIT WAS DENIED IN AN ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND
DISCRIMINATORY FASHION AND THAT SUMMIT COUNTY SHOULD BE
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THEM A BUILDING PERMIT FOR COMMERCIAL USE
OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WERE ALSO NOT PROPERLY
PRESENTED AND RESERVED AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL, ARE
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND ARE THEREFORE
UNTIMELY AND NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT FOR CONSIDERATION
ON THE MERITS.
Neither in their pleadings or in their arguments at the
trial court level, nor in their docketing statement filed in
conjunction with this appeal have the Stuckers ever argued that
their application for a permit to operate an auto body repair and
paint facility was denied in an arbitrary, capricious and
discriminatory fashion.

This represents an entirely new

argument which effectively shifts the focus from a "facial
challenge" to the legislative discretion and authority of the
Board of Summit County Commissioners in adopting the
compatibility assessment policy set forth in Chapter 5.6.3 of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code to an "as applied challenge"
to the specific basis for the decision of the Summit County
Planning Commission in denying the project on compatibility
issues.

In a similar fashion, while the estoppel argument may

have received passing mention in the pleadings and oral argument
at the trial court level, it was never sufficiently raised and

- 14 -
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1

Illustratively, had such a challenge been made at the
trial court level, Summit County would have provided a
comprehensive discussion of the cases defining the appropriate
standard of judicial review of similar types of local land use
decisions. Generally, the courts review the record of the
proceedings below to determine if it discloses a reasonable basis
for the decision in question, or in the alternative, whether the
action is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious.
Xanthos v Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032
(Utah 1984).

l

III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT THE STUCKERS DO NOT HAVE A VESTED RIGHT OR ENTITLEMENT
FOR COMMERCIAL USE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
AND THE DEFENSE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT AVAILABLE
TO AFFIRMATIVELY COMPEL ISSUANCE OF THE REQUESTED APPROVAL.
A.

VESTED RIGHTS ANALYSIS.

The Stuckers did not acquire an ownership interest, initiate
any actual use, begin construction or even make an application
for commercial use of the property in question prior to the
adoption of the compatibility assessment provisions of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code and therefore, do not have a
vested right or entitlement to receive a development permit or
building permit for commercial use of the property.
The Stuckers claim a vested right to commercial use of Lot
225 in the Highland Estates Subdivision on the basis of a
tortured interpretation of prior zoning designations of the
parcel and certain "grandfathering" provisions of the Snyderville
Basin Development Code.

The Stuckers7 claims regarding vested

rights, "grandfathering," nonconforming uses and estoppel rely on
a mischaracterization of those legal concepts and a
misinterpretation of the applicable Summit County Ordinances.2
2

Although the Stuckers did not object to the form or
content of the Summary Judgment And Order Of Dismissal entered by
the trial court in this matter, they now belatedly challenge the
trial court's failure to further explain the basis of its ruling.
That failure to object or move to correct any oversight precludes
review on appeal. Alford v Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791
P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In this instance, the trial court
also substantially complied with Rule 52(a) by stating that it
agreed with the argument and citation of authorities in Summit
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obtain any vested rights; i inder I Jtah 3 a/w

However, in order t o

ai I acti ia.1 a p p I J rat. KIII i s

required for a specifi c u s e of t h e proper ty which complies with
the requirements in effect at the time i t j s submitted in order
t i' tjht /t i n VMS 1, *M! I I gt i t s

:i ! l a p a x t i ci i] a r

c i e v e l opmonl. si:hc»M< < «i

proposed u s e .

Western Land Equities Inc. v City of Logan, 6;

P. 2d 3 88, 3 91

• 3 96 (Uta *

l

that case j II iisti ce Stewc

-J

a 1 1 property is 1 lelci suk-j^

*

zoning authority pursuant r

4i

»

^na^rity opinion

^

*
'

^ ^?tp

easonable exercise < i s~
u

-r* power and w a s
. . - nq

i

nticipated future zoning pi M

t

* - submissic

application for a specific u s e of the property

: * r ' ,aL

i 1 P 2d at 3 92

11' i t i n^ Avon Communi t y Developers, li ic, v South coast Regional
Commission, 553 P.2d 546 (Ca. 1978))

County's Memoranda. (R, at 2 88-2 8 9 ) ; Neerings v Utah State Bar,
817 P. 2d 320 (Utah 1.99] ) .

No such vested rights or entitlements are created by prior
zoning desiccations of parcels of property belonging to previous
owners.

Plciintiffs in the instant case do not claim to have

acquired any interest in the property for the purposes of this
analysis until March of 1990, five full years after the adoption
of the Snyderville Basin Development Code and the compatibility
assessment provisions at issue here.
Although the Highland Estates Subdivision was recorded prior
to the adoption of any zoning ordinance in Summit County, that
does not create any "vested right" in a subsequent purchaser of a
particular lot within the recorded plat to a specific zoning
designation or use of that lot until the individual obtains an
ownership interest and initiates an application in support of a
specific development proposal.

In the Western Land Equities

decision, Justice Stewart clearly identified the main focus of
any inquiry about vested rights or estoppel as being "substantial
reliance" by the owner, tested by the existence of some actual
physical construction or official approval by the governmental
entity in question.

Preconstruction activity such as the

execution of architectural drawings, the clearing of land, the
widening of roads, preparation of plans, conducting of boundary
surveys, and actions of a similar nature were identified as "not
sufficient to create a vested right . . ."

617 P.2d at 391-392.

The fundamental flaw in the Stucker's approach to this
entire analysis is to confuse the protection of the right to file
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a subdivision plat and conform to minimum lot size, area,
frontage and setback requirements with the vesting or * :.giv
m a k e a particular designated use ul HI y I .it.tc ci lot.

Nor

authorities relied on by the Stuckers support the proposition
that subsequently enacted zoning regulations do
e x i s t i n q p 1. 111 r»11

11 \ t /. *". i» I f

such lots because they lack

r.o

ODD'*

"" t 11 v y f 1 < \ 11111 | • -

necessary minimum siz^,

rentage

is t* separate -'-t

or similar physical requirements.

That

d ii

a I II! U'Wdli' 11
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-

of such platted lots.
The Development Code of Summit County which w a s adopted in
- ::.-

.

, :

-

Snyderville Basin Development Code

'*:•-

i -;

J

:..f,
2

•• of

the

addressed

"grandfathering" or the creation c : ested rightf^
contex t: of owners or developers oJ

;>ng-term multi-phased

project" which has received approval

' . separate

specific

project maste

. '

*

-m irom the Summi*

(K , at 204-iuu/ .
The Stuckers confuse this very specific provision dealing
* '

approved master plans for* pa i* t i < *u 1 -i i p m i ^ f t s with (foneral

county-wide master planning designating broad ranges of uses for
a] 1 property located within the Snyderville Basin.
analysis *•

LUIS J.ugica 1

Taking that

cone] i isi on wc i i] d resi I] t i n the ci: eati on

of a vested right or entitlement for ever y parcel of property i n
the entire County in perpetuity based on whatever original

historical designation was made at the time of the adoption of
the first master plan for the area.

Such an interpretation would

totally emasculate the ability of Summit County to reasonably
regulate land use within its borders and is completely contrary
to any reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions in
question or specific ordinances adopted by Summit County.
With the adoption of the Snyderville Basin Development Code
in 1985, only property where specific development had actually
been initiated pursuant to project master plans approved by the
Summit County Planning Commission for long-term multi-phased
projects under the old Development Code are "grandfathered" and
allowed to proceed under that old code.

The provisions of the

Snyderville Basin Development Code, as supported by the Statement
of Intent regarding § 1.3, articulate only those limited vested
rights.

(R. at 177-179).

It is obvious that no vested right or

entitlement is intended to be created in the future purchase of
any specific parcel or individual lot.

To hold otherwise would

represent an impermissible intrusion on the legislative
discretion and authority of the Board of Commissioners of Summit
County in local land use and zoning matters, which the courts of
this state have consistently cautioned against.

Crestview-

Holladay Homeowners Association, Inc. v Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d
1150, 1152 (Utah 1976); Gavland v Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633
(Utah 1961); Dowse v Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P.2d 723 (Utah
1953).
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pending at the ti me an application was submitted and the
applicant was aware of the proposed change,
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- vested right or
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or

a permit under those particular facts and circumstances.
Scherbel v Salt Lake City Corp , 758 P. 2d 8 9 ' ' ' "• a >
The undisputed facts adduced at +-*<= +*v-

» 988),
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level

establish that the Stuckers did ;.. K become the owners of the lot
in ••*-•<

:
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make commercia. ., - .•; the propert
the adoption or a p p l i c a b l e provisions
Dev*
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matter
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coin) (at it'll I ii v t i s s i ' S S i i H i n t
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provision.

Development Code appl
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* IKJ Snyderville Basin

".v- Stuckers, d e l u d i n g the
pa I in y ,

THE THEORY OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS ONLY
AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE WHICH MAY BE ASSERTED
AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY UNDER
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND DOES NOT APPLY
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED I N T H I S APPEAL,

The Stuckers allege that Summit County shouJ d be "estopped
from denying the plaintiffs their builrlinq permit."
(Appe 1 I ant « '" Bt let (it Mi |i
n number of reasons.
mentionec
coi ir t 1 €•

Tiir [ irupo*.. tt J um is without merit: ( nr

First, although the issue may have been

passing in pleadings and oral argument dt urv " "ial
w.

iit,»i/tMt i»;of f i c i ei itl y r a i sed to preserve
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appeal.

Illustratively, see, Shire Development v Frontier

Investments. 799 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Secondly, while the theory of equitable estoppel is
recognized cis an affirmative defense to governmental enforcement
of zoning lciws under exceptional circumstances, it is not an
alternative means for seeking extraordinary relief.3

The

Stuckers now attempt to use this equitable defense as a basis for
compelling the issuance of land use approval by Summit County.
Specifically, the Stuckers request that Summit County somehow "be
estopped" from denying the plaintiffs their building permit.
This approach represents a fundamental misunderstanding of
the concept of equitable estoppel, and confuses it with the
separate and distinct theory of zoning estoppel which has
previously been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.

In Western

Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980),
Justice Stewart carefully reviewed the theory of zoning estoppel
before rejecting it in favor of a vested rights analysis.

617

P.2d at 392-393.
In the present case, the Stuckers seek to use the doctrine
of estoppel to compel Summit County to grant their application
for commercial use of the property.

This tactic amounts to

nothing morei than a subterfuge for the Stuckers to reassert their
deficient vetsted rights claim in an attempt to present it in a
3

Utah County v Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981); Utah
County v Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); Salt Lake County v
Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976).
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form of a Writ of Mandamus may be an appropriate vehicle for
obtaining review of governmental 1 and use decisions under
appropriate cii i: cumstances.

Davis County v Clearfield City, 7 56

P.2d 7 04 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

However, that i s not how the

issues were framed at the trial court
importantly

level in this casi:1

II Ion*

such a belated attempt to reframe the issues should

not confuse the fundamental vested ri ghts analysis which clearly
demons!::!:: a t e s t h a t tl: le t::::ii: i a I n nn: t: cor r e c t ] y determi i led Si iiiiiiii t

County was entitled t

iudgment on those issues as a matter of

law (pp. 16- 211 , supra j ,
Fi ii: ther mor e , • it i i zoi il i: lq a n d I and u .'•:.*• • r n s e s , t h e d e f e n s e ol

equitable estoppel i s onl y available under exceptional
circumstances, not presented here, "such as the i ntentional
d i s v i' i in 111r11 t v a 111) J 11 • a t i o 11

1 1 111 > 111 i I in. i m v , "

Baxter f 6 3 b P , 2 c J i > 1, b b (Utah I(iHl),
affirmative duty
authorities i:e< -

Utah county v

All 1 andowner s have an

inquire and confer with local zoning
•

uses of the property that, would be

permitted and the doctrine can only be evoked where it can IK?
demonstrated that ] oca] 1 and \ ise and zoni ng authorities committed
an a f f i r mat i /o ac Il:: o r om :i ssi oi :i I lpoi :i w I ilc'l i a property owner re . ied
in making substantial changes in position or incurring extensive
expenses.

Utah County v Young, 615 p.2d 1265, 1267-1268 (Utah

1980).
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IV.
THE SNYDERVILLE BASIN DEVELOPMENT CODE OF SUMMIT COUNTY
IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER,
BOTH FACIALLY AND AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, AND
SETS ADEQUATE BOUNDARIES ON THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
IN APPLYING THE ABSOLUTE POLICY OF COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT.
The Stuckers contend that Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville
Basin Development Code establishing a compatibility assessment
process based on specific criteria as an absolute policy that
must be satisfied before any proposed development may receive
approval for a permit is somehow "an impermissible criterion."
The specific basis for this legal challenge proceeds under the
somewhat vaguely-defined theory that the procedures and
applicable criteria in the Snyderville Basin Development Code for
assessing compatibility somehow constitute an improper delegation
of authority to neighbors and adjoining property owners.
It has long been recognized by courts at both the federal
and state level that considerable flexibility and deference
should be afforded local planning and zoning authorities in
adopting land use regulations.

Village of Euclid v Ambler

Realty Co.. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Berman v Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954).
All presumptions favor the validity and reasonableness of
the zoning regulations adopted by local governmental authorities
and the burden is clearly on the party seeking judicial relief to
establish that the ordinance in question does not promote the
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the community.

.JS Zoning and Land Planning, §§ ] -31J
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this same issue on i
number of pri or occasi oris ai id repeatedly emphasized the narrow
scope of judicial review, whi ch is limited to determining whether
the actions of the local legislati ve
arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious.11

-

i I. I c c j a I ,

Crestview-Holladay

Homeowners Association, Inc. v Enah Floral Company, 545 P.2d
i ir>,>

libn,

n i n .ill

il» ' h i

As Justice Tuckett stated the proposition I n the CrestviewHolladay case:
The prior decisions of this court without
exception have laid down the rule that the exercise of
the zoning power is a legislative function to be
exercised by the legislative bodies of municipalities.
The wisdom of the zoning plan, its necessity, the
nature and boundaries of the district to be zoned are
matters which lie solely in that discretion. It is the
policy of this court as enunciated in its prior
decisions it will avoid substituting Its judgment for
that of the legislative body muni ci pal ity.
545 P.2d at 2 2 52
The need * - ^
pi:< . •

flexibility in dp. 1 i neat \\v\ I hi

DnsiderabJ

-

power to accommodate a wide range

of concerns has a v,^ ; >nq o<- *
treatment <-• r^stheti
ranfj i

•- a : -.i* *

.-•••.

use officials, the quest:*

ecognized, including the
Having identified surli 1 •. J

. . concerns; oli local zuruny nnd

1

=^d

becomes whether sufficient standards

a r e a r t i c u l a t e d lu y m u e d e c i s i o n makers .md pirnf-pr!

lcindMwm?is

from decisions which are arbitrary and capricious and have no
relation to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.
The Utah Supreme Court has also had occasion to address
these concerns in a similar challenge dealing with the criteria
for the issuance of conditional use permits.

In Thurston v

Cache County. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981), the court upheld a
vagueness challenge to a zoning ordinance dealing with
conditional use permits.

With respect to the ordinance being

challenged in that case, the Court held:
While it is true that a zoning ordinance must set
some ascertainable boundaries on the exercise of
discretion by a zoning authority, such boundaries are
not required to be unduly rigid or detailed. A
generalized exposition of overall standards or policy
goals suffices to meet the inquiry and deliberation of
the zoning authority, and to permit appellate review of
its decision.
626 P.2d at 443-444.
The Stuckers myopic focus on the initial attempt to reach a
consensus between the proposed land use and affected neighboring
property owners mischaracterizes both the procedure and the
applicable criteria that are specifically delineated in the
Snyderville Basin Development Code as part of the compatibility
assessment process.

The failure to reach consensus between

neighboring property owners and the applicant simply triggers an
additional public hearing to be conducted by the Planning
Commission.

The decision about whether a project is compatible

with surrounding property uses is ultimately made by the Planning
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ordinance.

Contrary t u uie osition of t h e Stuckers .in this case, t h e
compatibility assessment p o i
Development Code
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Chapter
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different impacts that

traditional zoning does n o t
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Snydervil.

Basin Development Code
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determine whether development is reasonably compatible and
sensit

J< *

eighboring uses based on a number of criteria,
tc • traff i c ai: i ::iii|( ' or par k i ng, pedestrj an

traffic, unsightly v i e w s , noise, artifici al lighting glare,
potential water runoff problems, odoi : nuisance, air or water
po] hit ion, rlinnq*.' in I In*1 t;hai"" di iici

ol

L lie a r e a

t„ak i mq (jpcii i:\paee

l o s s o f p r i v a c y , • n a t u r a l v e g e t a t i o n ai id h i s t o r i c a l 1 y v a l u a b l e
sites.

(R. a t 181-184)

Ii I this process, t h e input

neighbori i lg landowners is • :>J il y

advisory in nature and therefore entirely consistent with Justice
Hall's observation in t h e Thurston case:
While it is true that t h e consent of neighboring
landowners m a y n o t be made a criterion for t h e issuance
or denial of a conditional u s e permit, there is no
impropriety in t h e solicitation of or reliance upon,
information which m a y be furnished by other landowners
in t h e vicinity of the subject property at a public
hearing.
626 P. 2d at. .,-
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Under the provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development
Code, the compatibility assessment process appropriately solicits
input from neighboring property owners, but the ultimate decision
as to whether the proposed development is reasonably compatible
and sensitive to the immediate environment and surrounding
neighborhood rests with the Summit County Planning Commission.
Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville Basin Development Code sets
ascertainable limits on the parameters of the exercise of that
discretion by identifying relevant topics to be discussed and
suggesting relevant solutions to identified impacts. (R. at 181184).

The trial court properly concluded, as a matter of law,

that the ordinance does not impermissibly delegate the exercise
of the zoning authority to surrounding property owners.
The Stuckers' challenge to Chapter 5.6.3 of the Snyderville
Basin Development Code as applied to their specific application
for authorization to develop the site in question as a auto body
and detail shop is equally without merit.

As a threshold

proposition, such a claim was not presented at the trial court
level and is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see
pp. 12-15, supra).

Nonetheless, the undisputed facts establish

that the neighborhood compatibility assessment meeting held on
August 2, 1990 and the public hearing held before the Summit
County Planning Commission on August 28, 1990 identified a number
of significant concerns tracking the criteria established in the
ordinance to support the conclusion that the proposed development
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was not reasonably compatible with and sensitive to the immediate
environment and neighboring uses.

The undisputed facts

established in the record identify concerns and issues including,
but not limited to, increased traffic, curves and blind spots on
the road providing access to the property that may represent
safety hazards, incompatibility of this proposed commercial use
with surrounding residential uses and the country atmosphere in
the vicinity, possible lowering of neighboring property values,
conflicts over increased traffic and school bus routing and other
related issues.

(R. at 193-197).

The Stuckers are simply

disappointed at the outcome and are asking this Court to
substitute its judgment for that of local planning and land use
officials.

That approach should be rejected and the decision of

the trial court upheld.
CONCLUSION
The Stuckers are perhaps understandably disappointed that
they have not been able to receive approval for their intended
use of the property in question as an auto body repair and paint
facility.

However, the trial court correctly determined on the
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basis of the undisputed facts that Summit County is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Based on all the arguments set

forth above, that decision should be upheld.
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